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Abstract. How do religions refer to reality in their language and symbols, and 
which reality do they envisage and encounter? on the basis of some examples 
of an  understanding of religion without reference to reality, I  first answer 
the question of what ‘realism’ is. realism has been an  opposite concept to 
nominalism, idealism, empiricism and antirealism. The paper concentrates 
especially on the most recent formation of realism in opposition to antirealism. 
In a second section the consequences for philosophy of religion and theology 
are considered. How the reality, as it is considered in philosophy of religion 
and in theology, has to be characterised, if and how this reality is relevant for 
human beings, and what its relation is to everything else, can only be answered 
and clarified in a presentation in a language that is specific for this reality, the 
reality of God.
If we look on the manifold phenomena of the various religions then one 
of the questions we are confronted with is how they refer to reality and 
which reality we envisage and encounter in them. In their respective lives 
human beings relate themselves and their world to God, to a wholeness, 
a first cause and final goal or another form of transcendence – depending 
on how this is conceived in their respective religion. From there they 
orient their lives in the world and define their religious identities. 
Depending on the conception of this religious horizon of reference in 
the various religions and denominations, the religious identities and 
orientations of the believers are shaped by different grades of an awareness 
of their freedom and dependence, and with that by a different awareness 
of whether realities on earth can be changed or have fatefully to be 
accepted. In respect to the question of heteronomy and autonomy, 
religions and their conceptions of the transcendent differ – and with that 
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in respect to the orientations of religious identities to given origins and 
backgrounds, which mainly are present in the form of divine laws or 
promised expectations of a future.
modern Protestant Christianity for example has very much 
emphasised that from its conception of the relation of God and world, 
of creator and creature, follows a  specific relation of freedom and 
dependence in the religious awareness of the believers: in Protestant 
Christianity the world is conceived to be a  space of freedom given by 
God to human beings, which human beings may explore and organise 
with reason, which as well is given by God. The sticking to the freedom 
of human beings within the world is grounded in the belief that God 
himself in his relation to the world is free. Therefore the reference of 
the religious identity in Protestant Christianity and its orientation to 
freedom is in the first instance a result of God’s freedom, who lets the 
believers participate in his reality.
In other religions and other denominations, the religious identity of 
believers is formed differently and believers orient themselves differently 
within the world as in Protestant Christianity. It is exactly this diversity 
of religious orientation of human beings and the plurality of religious 
identities which raises the question of whether the religious awareness 
of human beings refers at all to reality, or whether it represents rather 
products of human culture, which have been developed in the course of 
history in order to cope with daily life.
There is a  prominent opinion in the discussions about religious 
plurality that religions do not refer to reality but articulate specific 
attitudes and preferences in respect to reality. but then it seems to be the 
task to interpret religious articulations and practices in reference to the 
respective cultural, moral and ideological beliefs, or in reference to the 
emotions of religious people. religious articulations and practices then 
are not about a reality but the subjective point of view of human beings 
on themselves and their world.1
1 In the following considerations I shall use material from former publications of mine, 
especially: H.-P.  Großhans, Theologischer Realismus: Ein sprachphilosophischer Beitrag 
zur einer theologischen Sprachlehre (Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 1996); H.-P.  Großhans, 
‘Die Wirklichkeit Gottes in der Debatte zwischen realismus und Anti-realismus’, 
in: Metaphysik und Religion: Die Wiederentdeckung eines Zusammenhanges, ed. by H. 
Deuser (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), pp. 102-118; H.-P. Großhans, Art. 
realismus: II. religionsphilosophisch, rGG4, bd. 7 (Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 2004), 
p.  74; H.-P.  Großhans, Art. realismus: III. Fundamentaltheologisch, rGG4, bd. 7 
(Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 2004), pp. 74-76.
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I. relIGIoN WITHouT reFereNCe To reAlITY?
I want to illustrate what it means to understand religion without reference 
to reality with two positions: with the understanding of religion to be 
a language game, inspired by Wittgenstein; and with the understanding, 
which has some popularity in present day Protestant theology, of religion 
to be an interpretation of life.
1.1. Religions being an interpretation of life
Following Dietrich Korsch, in order to act man has to interpret. ‘For 
acting, concepts of aims become necessary, as well as symbols of the 
motives for acting and of the ways of achieving aims, symbols for the 
ability of in fact achieving aims.’2 religious interpretations – implicit or 
explicit – combine assumptions about the continuous backgrounds and 
frameworks of acting with the process of acting and the life of the actor. 
With them is presented ‘a figurative overall context ... which provides 
a horizon for acting’. This is an act of definition: in the defined horizon 
human beings orient themselves in life.
In that process religious interpretations cannot be without 
objectivisations. ‘Ideas about seemingly objective realities are formed; 
images of seemingly ulterior worlds; metaphors which bring to mind 
the connection of this and that other world. but these objects don’t want 
to claim objective realities, don’t want to describe. Instead, they are 
important points of orientation for us in our world, easily coexisting with 
other attempts of determining our place in the world ... That becomes 
apparent especially by realising that the function of giving orientation is 
much more important than that of apparent factual claims.’3
2 ‘mit dem Handeln werden Vorstellungen über Ziele nötig, Sinnbilder für die motive 
des Handelns und die Wege zum Ziel, Symbole für die Fähigkeit, Ziele auch erreichen zu 
können.’ D. Korsch, Dogmatik im Grundriß: Eine Einführung in die christliche Deutung 
menschlichen Lebens mit Gott (Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 2000), p. 192.
3 ‘es werden Vorstellungen entwickelt von scheinbar objektiven Gegebenheiten; bilder 
von scheinbar jenseitigen Welten; metaphern, die den Zusammenhang dieser und jener 
Welt zu bewußtsein bringen. Aber diese Gegenstände sind gar keine in einem neutral-
konstatierenden Sinn. Sondern sie sind Eckpunkte der Orientierung unserer selbst in der 
Welt; durchaus koexistierend mit anderen Ansätzen und Versuchen, unseren ort in der 
Welt zu bestimmen  ... Dies zeigt sich vor allem darin, daß die orientierungsfunktion 
viel wichtiger ist als die vermeintliche Sachverhaltsbehauptungen.’ Ibid., p. 193. In that 
understanding, for example the Apostolic Creed is a paradigmatic example of religious 
interpretation: ‘It is comprehensive in the sense that it looks in metaphorical language 
for the foundation and the end of the world in God. What ever we do, we do it in a world 
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but then the question has to be raised: how real is the horizon, which 
is mediated by a religion, to human life and acting, and as well to one’s 
own self-interpretation of human life? What is real within all the ideas 
that are used in the process of a religious interpretation of life?4
We find the opinion, as in Korsch, that the advantage of an under-
standing of religions as interpretation of life is to avoid claims that 
religions assert objective realities much clearer in the writings of Wilhelm 
Gräb: ‘religious phrases about the world, about human history and 
about our own life explicitly want to be understood metaphorically  ... 
They have meaning for us and give meaning to our lives only when 
we do not understand them as claims about objective realities but as 
interpretations which make it possible for us to ascribe meaning to the 
world, to nature and to history, which are not meaningful by themselves.’5 
What is articulated in religions does not express reality, but prescribes 
sense to reality in nature and history.
which is made accessible for us by God. And whatever happens to us, we’re never 
anywhere else than in God’s hand. All acting, with its presuppositions and contexts as 
well as with its possible results and even last consequences, is held by God.’ [‘es ist einmal 
umfassend, sofern es in seiner symbolischen Sprache den Grund und das ende der Welt 
bei Gott sucht. Was immer wir tun, wir tun es in einer von Gott uns eröffneten Welt. und 
was immer mit uns geschieht, wir befinden uns niemals woanders als in Gottes Hand. 
Alles Handeln ist sowohl in seinen materialen bezügen und Anschlüssen als auch in 
seinen möglichen Folgen, ja letzten Konsequenzen durch Gott gehalten.’ (ibid.)]
4 If one looks into the details of Dietrich Korsch’s arguments one may nevertheless 
get the impression, that these interpretations are made on the basis of proposed realities. 
Korsch speaks about God as if he is active and effective. ‘God is conceived to be the 
triune God because he is in motion, in himself and beyond himself.’ [‘Gott wird darum 
gerade als der dreieine Gott gedacht, weil er sich in einer Bewegung  befindet, in sich 
selbst und über sich selbst hinaus.’ (ibid., p. 194).] or: ‘The unity of Father and Son is 
not a sealed unified whole, but involves human beings in divine life.’ [‘Die einheit von 
Vater und Sohn ist  ... nichts in sich Geschlossenes, sondern zieht die menschen ... ins 
göttliche leben hinein.’ (ibid.)] In such sentences God seems to be an effective power, 
to which human beings relate themselves in images and ideas and in reference to which 
they interpret their own lives.
5 ‘Die Sätze des Glaubens über die Welt, über die Geschichte der menschen und die 
unseres eigenen lebens [wollen] von uns explizit in ihrem symbolischen Sinn verstanden 
sein ... Sie haben für uns nur Sinn und sie geben uns in unserem leben nur Sinn, wenn 
wir sie nicht als objektive Wirklichkeitsbehauptungen nehmen, sondern bewußt als 
Deutungen, vermöge deren wir die Welt, die Natur und die Geschichte, die an sich keinen 
Sinn haben, in einen solchen für uns überführen können.’ W. Gräb, Lebensgeschichten –
Lebensentwürfe – Sinndeutungen: Eine Praktische Theologie gelegter Religion (Gütersloh: 
Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2000), p. 18.
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The understanding of religion as interpretation of life via prescription 
of sense is programmatically proposed by ulrich barth. According 
ulrich barth, religion is interpretation of experience in the horizon of 
the idea of the absolute (‘Deutung von erfahrung im Horizont der Idee 
des unbedingten.’)6 In religion, human beings interpret their experience 
within the world by moving it into another horizon, the horizon of the 
idea of the absolute. barth uses here Paul Tillich’s famous definition of 
religion as being the relation to that which is of ultimate concern to 
us. religion is a  specific relation of the human mind to the ultimate 
and absolute: a relation that is characterized by a final and unreserved 
concern. We make our experiences in the horizon of the conditional. 
In religion we subordinate these experiences to an  interpretation by 
moving them into the horizon of the idea of the unconditional and 
absolute. According to ulrich barth, this horizon of the unconditional 
is itself a  pure product of interpretation. This horizon follows from 
an  interpretation of human awareness and consciousness, and the 
analyses of its given structure. In being a pure product of interpretation 
the dimension of the unconditional and absolute can surely ‘constitute 
an  independent semantic level, but no argument can be found for 
the existence of an  extensional dimension which is correlated to this 
intensional dimension.’7 religious consciousness and awareness is not 
concerned with understanding objects, but is a second order change of 
perspectives (‘Perspektivenwechsel zweiter Stufe’).8 religion therefore 
is not concerned with knowledge, but with a  ‘specific kind of human 
interpretation, i.e. interpretation of reality in the horizon of infinity, 
wholeness, eternity and necessity.’9 These four transcendental dimensions 
of the idea of the unconditional absolute satisfy a ‘function of endowment 
with meaning’ (‘Sinnanreicherungs- oder Sinnstiftungsfunktion’), but do 
6 u. barth, ‘Was ist religion?’, in: Religion in der Moderne, ed. by u. barth (Tübingen: 
mohr Siebeck, 2003), p. 10.
7 ‘... eine eigenständige Sinn- und bedeutungsebene konstituieren, für eine diesem 
intensionalen bezug des bewußtseins korrelierende extensionale Dimension sei 
jedoch so kein Argument zu finden.’ r. barth, Absolute Wahrheit und endliches 
Wahrheitsbewußtsein: Das Verhältnis von logischem und theologischem Wahrheitsbegriff – 
Thomas von Aquin, Kant, Fichte und Frege: religion in Philosophy and Theology, 13 
(Tübingen: mohr Siebeck, 2004), p. 56.
8 u. barth, ‘Was ist religion?’, p. 10.
9 ‘... spezifische Form menschlicher Deutungsleistung, nämlich als Deutung 
der Wirklichkeit im Horizont ihrer unendlichkeits-, Ganzheits-, ewigkeits- und 
Notwendigkeitsdimension’. Ibid., p. 14.
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not give a foundation to the idea of real and ideal conditioning. religion 
is a  phenomenon on the intensional level, not on an  extensional one. 
religion does not want to inform about an ideal or real foundation and 
reason of human life or the world, but prescribes sense to reality which 
is experienced as nature and history.
1.2. Religion as a language game
The second conception of religion, which I want to hint to here in our 
symposium, is often used in the sense that religion is not about objective 
claims about reality. According to ludwig Wittgenstein, cultural and 
religious diversity has to be understood as a plurality of language games. 
This is a widespread opinion.
According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of an expression is constituted 
through the rules of its use in concrete social situations. This is similar 
to the meaning or function of a figure in a game, which is given through 
the rules of the game. If we are asking for the meaning of an expression, 
then we have to examine the rules of the language game in which it is 
used. We then have to analyse its use in concrete social situations and 
cultural contexts. It is a popular understanding of Wittgenstein’s concept 
of language games that according to him we are always concerned with 
a language as a closed system, in which an expression has its meaning only 
in the relations immanent in that system and as expressions of human 
beings in specific situations. Consequently, we have to sort expressions 
into the system of a  language game and to relate it to the situation of 
its use. Then we find out how human beings understand themselves in 
a specific situation and how they act in that specific situation.
If we follow this understanding of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy for 
philosophy of religion, then religious expressions and assertions are 
reduced to ‘expressions of individual ways of life’ (‘Ausdrucksphänomene 
individueller lebensweisen’) – as Falk Wagner formulated.10 but then – 
according Wagner – we have the problem that the theories of religion 
which are constructed in the horizon of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy 
are not able ‘to determine the claimed cognitive content of faith because 
they make it dependent on autonomous language games.’11 religious 
10 F. Wagner, Was ist religion?: Studien zu ihrem begriff und Thema in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus mohn, 1986), p. 439.
11 ‘den von einer Glaubensansicht beanspruchten kognitiven Gehalt zu bestimmen, 
weil sie ihn von autonomen Sprachspielen abhängig [machen]’ Ibid., p. 437.
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language games depict no objectivity, but are only about ‘Subjective acts 
of faith’ (‘subjektive Glaubensvollzüge’). We can find similar judgments 
about the relevance of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy for philosophy of 
religion in many other theologians and philosophers of religion.
What Wagner criticises seems to others to be the advantage of the 
concept of language games. because with this theory we seem to be able 
to conceive the cultural and religious plurality in a radical way. And: If 
religious expressions and actions include no claims about reality, then 
the discussion about reality has no religious dimension.
In my analysis, all these understandings of a  Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of religion have not gone to the necessary depth of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. because Wittgenstein as well has formulated 
in one of his remarks: ‘Not empiricism yet realism in philosophy, that’s 
the hardest thing.’12
II. WHAT IS ‘reAlISm’?
We find a ‘realism’ in the history of philosophy and theology at various 
times. According to Paul Tillich, realism is a philosophical fighting word.13 
What at a time was understood as ‘realism’ becomes clear especially if 
we look on the respective alternatives. Alternatives to realism have been 
nominalism, idealism, empiricism, and antirealism.
most times in its history, theology preferred realistic conceptions. 
The dominant ontological position was that there is a God independent 
of our conceptions, knowledge, or assertions of God. From this followed 
epistemologically and semantically the position that God should not be 
identified with our conceptions, knowledge, or assertions of God. It is 
in that sense that Joseph runzo defined theological realism (some years 
ago): ontologically theological realism is ‘the view that there is a trans-
cendent divine reality independent of human thought’, respectively the 
belief, ‘that there exists a trans cendent divine reality, independent at least 
12 ‘Nicht empirie und doch realismus in der Philosophie, das ist das schwerste.’ 
l. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, ed. by G. e. m. 
Anscombe and others: Werkausgabe, bd. 6, 4th edn. (Frankfurt a. m.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 
p. 325.
13 Cf. P.  Tillich, ‘Gläubiger realismus I’, in Philosophie und Schicksal: Schriften 
zur erkenntnislehre und existenzphilosophie, ed. by P. Tillich: Gesammelte Werke IV 
(Stuttgart: evangelisches Verlegs-Werk, 1961), pp. 77-87 (p. 77).
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in part of human thought, action and attitu des’.14 God is then conceived 
as a real object, which does not exist because it is intended from us as 
an object.
but in difference to metaphysical realism it is acknowledged epistemo-
logically and semantically that in respect to the reality of God and the 
concept of God ‘the human mind contributes to the very content of what 
is perceived and so known’.15
realism has a long history, in which its definition and the opposing 
conceptions always again changed. For example, Hegel in his ‘History of 
Philosophy’ noticed a  different understanding of realism in scholastic 
times  – to which nominalism was the opposing conception  – and in 
his own time, which was distinguished from idealism.16 According to 
Hegel, in scholastic philosophy realism was about the ontological status 
14 J. runzo, ‘Introduction’, in Is God Real? ed. by J. runzo: library of Philosophy and 
religion (basingstoke: macmillan, 1993), pp. I-XXIV (p. XIII).
15 Ibid., p. XIV.
16 Hegel formulated the difference that way: ‘Those who maintain that universals exist 
independently from the thinking subject and independent from individual things, and 
that ideas are the essence of things are called realists – in sharp contrast to what is called 
realism nowadays. In our use, this term designates the philosophical position that things 
independently have real existence; what is denied by idealism. later the philosophical 
view that only ideas – as opposed to individual things – are real was called idealism. 
In scholastics realism meant that universals were independent real entities: ideas were 
incorruptible in contrast to material things, ideas were immutable and the only real 
entities. In contrast the nominalists, also called formalists, maintained that universals 
were only concepts, subjective generalisations, products of the human mind; when one 
used categories, etc., that were only words, formulas, made up by the human soul, totally 
subjective, concepts for and made up by us – only the individual was real. ’ [‘Diejenigen, 
welche behaupteten, daß die universalien außer dem denkenden Subjekte unterschieden 
vom einzelnen Dinge ein existierendes reales seyen, das Wesen der Dinge allein die Idee 
sey, hießen realisten, – hier in ganz entgegengesetzem Sinne gegen das, was heutiges 
Tags realismus heißt. Dieser Ausdruck hat bei uns nämlich den Inhalt, daß die Dinge, 
wie sie unmittelbar sind, eine wirkliche existenz haben; und der Idealismus steht dem 
entgegen. Idealismus nannte man später die Philosophie, welche den Ideen allein realität 
zuschrieb, indem er behauptet, daß die Dinge, wie sie in der einzelnheit erscheinen, nicht 
ein Wahrhaftes sind. Der realismus der Scholastiker behauptet, daß das Allgemeine ein 
Selbständiges, Fürsichseyendes, existierendes sey: die Ideen sind nicht der Zerstörung 
unterworfen, wie die natürlichen Dinge, unveränderlich, und allein ein wahres Seyn. 
Wogegen die Anderen, die Nominalisten oder Formalisten, behaupteten, das universale 
sey nur Vorstellung, subjektive Verallgemeinerung, Produkt des denkenden Geistes; 
wenn man Gattungen u.s.f. formire, so seyen dies nur Namen, Formelles, ein von der Seele 
Gebildetes und Subjektives, Vorstellungen für uns, die wir machen – nur das Individuelle 
sey das reale’] (G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by 
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of general terms. That realism assumed the reality of the general in 
(individual) things. In contrast nominalism accepted only the reality of 
the individual objects.
The conceptions were very different in the time of Hegel. There realism 
was the concept that individual objects (things) have their real existence 
only in their immediate being. The source of this understanding of realism 
was Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure reason’. In Kant, realism is concerned with 
the question of the existence (and the mode of existence) of the temporal-
spatial world and the question about the relation between appearance 
and being in itself. In the first edition of the ‘Critique of Pure reason’, 
Kant criticised transcendental realism, which holds that space and time 
are in itself (that is, independent from human sensibility) given. ‘The 
transcendental realist construes appearances as things themselves which 
exist independently from us and our sensibility.’17 For Kant the problem 
was that pure perceptions are made things as such (‘bloße Vorstellungen 
zu Sachen an sich selbst.’)18 His own position, opposing transcendental 
realism, Kant called ‘transcendental idealism’, which he combined 
with an  ‘empirical realism’ (‘empirischer realism’), expressing in it the 
belief that the existence and order of the temporal-spatial world of 
experience do not depend on the empirical subject, but are nevertheless 
in a constitutive relation with human consciousness.
originally, analytical philosophy, in developing realism, did not 
built on Kant. Kant did not become important for realism again  – in 
a  relevant sense  – before the 1970s. In analytical philosophy, a  first 
form of realism was conceived as anti-idealism. This happened in the 
‘refutation of Idealism’ of G.e. moore,19 where he destroyed berkeley’s 
motto ‘esse is percipi’.20 Characteristic for this type of realism is the belief 
H.  Glockner: Sämtliche Werke in 20 bänden, einer Hegel-monographie und einem 
Hegel-lexikon, 19, 3 vols (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1928), III, pp. 181-2.
17 ‘Der transcendentale realist stellt sich also äußere erscheinungen  ... als Dinge 
an sich selbst vor, die unabhängig von uns und unserer Sinnlichkeit existiren.’ I. Kant, 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. by W. Weischedel: Werke in sechs bänden, 2 (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche buchgesellschaft, 1956), pp. 375-6 (A 369).
18 Ibid., pp. 460-1 (A 491).
19 Cf. G. e. moore, ‘The refutation of Idealism’, in Philosophical Studies, ed. by G. e. 
moore: International library of psychology philosophy and scientific method (london: 
Kegan Paul, 1922), pp. 1-30.
20 Cf. G. berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. by 
A. A. luce and T. e. Jessop: The Works of George berkeley, 2: bibliotheca britannica 
philosophica (london: Nelson, 1949), pp. 1-113 (p. 42) (I, § 3).
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that the existence and nature of the world are given independent from 
the human mind and consciousness. moore emphasised the distinction 
of an  act of consciousness and its object, and claimed that the object 
exists independent from the act of consciousness (which may be an act 
of perceiving, conceiving, etc.). He emphasised that not only is the 
perception of something the object of cognition, but the existence of the 
object itself. And finally he emphasised that truth and falsity refer not to 
beliefs but to the objects of belief. 
The realism of logical Atomism was criticised strongly in the 
decades that followed. Paradigmatically for this we can call to mind 
the development in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but also the empiricism 
and Positivism of the 20th century. It was then in the follow up of 
‘ordinary-language-Philosophy’ that realism appeared once again on 
the philosophical agenda.
This new type of realism followed from problems in the philosophy 
of language. Here realism generally claims that the names and terms, 
which are used in a theory about a defined area (of science or life), refer 
to objects (things), which exist independent from human thinking and 
speaking.21 This general position is combined with the claims, (1) that 
truth is independent from rational justification, (2) that there is strict 
bivalence – a proposition is either true or false – and a correspondence 
theory of truth is possible, and (3) that the semantics of our sentences 
have to be conceived as consequences of the objective conditions of 
truth. This development of a realism in the philosophy of language was 
supported by a  parallel discussion in the theory of science, in which 
a ‘scientific realism’ was developed.
The motives for these new conceptions of realism in the philosophy 
of language and the philosophy of science came mainly from the critique 
of logical empiricism and Positivism respectively. According to Hilary 
Putnam, logical empiricism misses the idea of a  correspondence of 
cognition respective knowledge and reality, but as well an idea to orient 
the meaning of lingual expressions to reality. According to Putnam, 
positivistic and empiricistic theories of meaning are characterised by 
two assumptions:
(1) ‘That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in 
a certain psychological state’.
21 Cf. m. Kober, Art. realismus: I. philosophisch, rGG4, bd. 7 (Tübingen: mohr 
Siebeck, 2004), pp. 72-4.
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(2) ‘That the meaning of a  term (in the sense of “intension”) 
determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension 
entails sameness of extension).’22
In empiricism  – according Putnam  – the extension of an  expression 
is identified with its intension in the individual use of language. The 
meaning of an  expression in the mind (or consciousness) of its user 
defines its extension – and not the other way round. This is a different 
position to those understandings of religion as interpretation of life and 
prescribing sense, which I referred to in my first section. empiricism does 
not claim that the expressions we use have no extension at all. empiricism 
knows an extension of expressions, but understands it as given with the 
intension of the use of language. This position was criticised with the 
motto: ‘“meanings” just ain’t in the head’.23 The meaning of an expression 
is given with its reference, with that to which it refers.
With the emphasis on the reference of an  expression, the reality, 
which is addressed in the expression, becomes present beyond its sensual 
appearance, its impressions, or its theoretical reconstructions. The ‘other’ 
of language, which does not follow from the inner self-references of 
language and its semantical interplay of meanings, can now be conceived 
as an  essential part of language and human talking. In philosophy of 
language the problem of indefiniteness is addressed with the expression 
‘reality’, to which we refer with language, although we cannot fully grasp 
and describe it and whose existence is independent from our referring 
and talking about it.
If we relate these general considerations to ‘God’, then it becomes 
thinkable and conceivable that the lingual predications of God, which 
necessarily are not fully satisfying, and also manifold human God-talk 
may refer to God  – a  reference which is not identical with its lingual 
form. like other words the word ‘God’ articulates a  reference, which 
is not identical with the respective human consciousness of God and 
which does not only refer to this consciousness.
but does this model not lead directly to a relativistic scepticism?
An  example from philosophy of language which supports such 
a  suspicion is ‘cultural relativism’, like benjamin lee Whorf originally 
22 H. Putnam, ‘The meaning of “meaning”’, in, Mind, Language und Reality, ed. by 




proposed it: a  position which is especially widespread among the 
proponents of a  pluralistic theory of religions. According to Whorf, 
language in the first instance is ‘a classification and arrangement of the 
stream of sensory experience which results in a  certain world-order’.24 
every natural language represents a  world view (Weltbild), which is 
a specific interpretation of all the unformed sensual experiences, which 
as a kind of raw material is the basis of all human languages.25 In respect 
to religion we then could assume unformed religious experiences of 
human beings, which are conceptualised by the various religious and 
denominational traditions and with this given a specific form. We find 
this model for example in John Hick’s pluralistic theory of religions: 
the transcendent, which Hick calls ‘The reAl’, is the joint point of 
reference of all religions and of all religious experience, which in the 
various religions is articulated and conceived in various different ways 
and forms.
This model more or less has been overcome – at least theoretically. 
Donald Davidson called it the ‘third dogma of empiricism’ and criticised 
it decisively.26 The relation of language and reality has to be conceived 
differently. It was Wittgenstein’s special interest – in my analysis – to look 
for the real within its lingual expression. And this is exactly the point of 
24 b. l. Whorf, ‘The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi’, in 
Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings, ed. by J. b. Caroll, Foreword by S. 
Chase: Technology Press books in the social sciences (Cambridge: Technology Press of 
massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), pp. 51-56 (p. 55).
25 This interpretation of the world according Whorf shows that every natural language 
entails an implicit metaphysics. ‘The Hopi language and culture conceals a metaphysics, 
such as our so-called naive view of space and time does, or as the relativity theory does; yet 
it is a different metaphysics from either. In order to describe the structure of the universe 
as according to the Hopi, it is necessary to attempt ... to make explicit this metaphysics, 
properly describable only in the Hopi language, by means of an approximation expressed 
in our own language’ (b. l. Whorf, ‘An  American Indian model of the universe’, in 
Language, Thought and Reality, ed. by J. b Caroll, pp. 57-64 (p. 58)).
26 D. Davidson, ‘on the very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation, ed. by D. Davidson: Collected essays, 2 (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
pp. 183-198 (p. 189). It is the third dogma of empiricism following the two dogmas, which 
Quine has ascribed to empiricism; cf. W. V. o. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of empiricism’, in 
From a Logical Point of View: 9 logico-philosophical Essays, ed. by W. V. o. Quine, 2nd rev. 
edn. (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard univiversity Press 1980), pp. 20-46. The first dogma of 
empiricism is the fundamental separation of analytical truth, which is independent of 
facts, and synthetic truth, which is grounded in facts. The second dogma of empiricism 
is reductionism: ‘the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical 
construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience’ (ibid., p. 20).
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Wittgenstein’s remark, that realism is the most difficult in philosophy. 
This is because the reference to reality cannot be separated from the 
language we use.
According to Putnam, from these considerations it follows that: ‘the 
truth can be told in language games that we actually play when language 
is working.’27 I cannot go into the details of all the related problems and 
the extensive philosophical discussion on that issue. Here I only want to 
hint to the claim that there is not much justification for the assumption 
that the real world itself gives us the way how the world has to be ordered 
into objects, situations, properties, etc.
This point was emphasised in anti-realism, which especially was put 
forward by michael Dummett.28 If the real world does not tell us how she 
should be ordered in language, then the meanings can only be constituted 
by the way in which they are formed, and the truth of a  proposition 
can then only be justified within a  language. Truth then cannot be 
a correspondence to an assumed reality, but truth is ‘an idealisation of 
rational acceptability’.29 The only criterion ‘for what is a fact ... [is] what 
it is rational to accept’30 – and this in the context of a language which is 
used in a specific discourse.
Already Wittgenstein has seen that every understanding of language 
and human talking is accompanied by ontological and epistemological 
assumptions and implications. but he insisted that we can and should not 
separate these metaphysical issues from the factual and actual talking of 
people and from their use of language, and therefore should consider 
these issues not separately, because they are intrinsically related to the 
used and spoken language. These metaphysical issues cannot adequately 
be conceived beyond and independent from the use of language when 
human beings are talking. Therefore the word ‘reality’ as well has its 
place in the human use of language. We operate with this expression.
27 H. Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge mass.: Harvard university Press, 
2004), p. 22.
28 Cf. m. Dummett, Truth and other Enigmas, 2nd edn. (london: Duckworth 1992), 
p. Xl; m. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (london: Duckworth, 1991); m. 
Dummett, The Seas of Language (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); m. Dummett, Truth 
and the Past, Foreword by A. bilgrami: Columbia themes in philosophy (New York: 
Columbia university Press, 2004).




Now, in talking about reality we articulate in the use of language 
the indefiniteness with which every language, every talking, and every 
knowledge is confronted. If we talk about reality, for example, the 
experience that is expressed is that we are talking with others about 
something, and this ‘something’ is not identical with that which we have 
said about it in the language. We talk about something and we refer 
together to this ‘something’, despite the fact that we communicate to each 
other not the same but different knowledge. Therefore we have to discuss 
whether we talk about the same ‘something’. To fix this joint reference 
depends now strongly on the terminology we use. This points to the fact 
that we talk and conceive this ‘something’ not only differently, but that 
this ‘something’ is what it is in the respective language and terminology. 
Surely, what we address as reality exists not because we address it and 
talk about it. but reality is, for us, how we know, conceive, and formulate 
it in language. It is exactly this difference which makes it possible to 
evaluate critically, in reference to reality, what we have come to know, 
what we conceive and formulate as real. We operate with this critical 
distinction permanently. It is reasonable to address what we talk about 
as reality, which precedes our talking and which is not identical with our 
talking. look for examples in situations of communication: An opinion 
surely can with authority be confronted with another opinion. but 
such a dissent is more convincing if the contradicting opinion gets its 
authority from its reference to the addressed reality. What we formulate 
in discourses as objects is at the same time constructed and discovered. 
The insights of other opinions are convincing if they create discoveries 
about the object that is addressed.
III. CoNSeQueNCeS For PHIloSoPHY 
oF relIGIoN AND THeoloGY
We can illustrate the consequences of my considerations for the 
discussion in religious studies and cultural anthropology in the context 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This discussion was about ‘primitive 
societies’ (with the paradigm of the African people of Azande) and 
evans-Pritchard’s notion of magic, which was related to the concept of 
reality and science in modern Western societies.31 Despite the explicit 
31 Cf. e. e. evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1937). evans-Pritchard has been critically discussed by Peter Winch. 
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hermeneutical principle for an  investigation of primitive societies like 
the Azande, which stated that ‘in order to understand the Azande 
conceptions we must understand them in terms of how they are taken 
by the Azande themselves and in terms of their own social structure, i.e. 
forms of life’,32 evans-Pritchard nevertheless claimed that  – compared 
with Western cultures – the Azande followed an illusion, because there 
is no magic and there are no witches: ‘our scientific account of these 
matters is in accord with objective reality while the Azande magical 
beliefs are not.’33
Peter Winch also had the opinion that the perceptions and conceptions 
of human beings have to be verified ‘by reference to something 
independent  – some reality’.34 but nevertheless he was convinced that 
it is wrong ‘to characterise the scientific in terms of that which is “in 
accord with objective reality”’.35 We cannot simply assume and claim that 
our scientific perceptions and conceptions correspond with reality, how 
it really is. because the research on the culture of the Azande shows that 
they have a totally different understanding of reality. The verification of 
the independent reality is not specific only for the natural sciences. It 
is a not justified presupposition that the scientific discourse is the only 
paradigm, which functions as a verification of the objective adequacy of 
other discourses.
but already Wittgenstein has critically discussed a work of social anthropology in the 
tradition of the enlightenment. Wittgenstein has commented on the at his time popular 
book of James George Frazer: J. G. Frazer, The New Golden Bough: A New Abridgement 
of the Classic Work, ed. and with notes and foreword by T. H. Gaster, 2nd edn. (New 
York: Phillips, 1965). but Wittgenstein did not read the edition in 12 Volumes, but 
only the short version of Fraser’s study in one volume: J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: 
A Study in Magic and Religion: Abridged Edition, 5th edn. (london: macmillan, 1925). 
Cf. l. Wittgenstein, ‘bemerkungen über Frazers Golden bough’, in l. Wittgenstein, 
Vortrag über Ethik und andere kleine Schriften, ed. by J. Schulte: Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch 
Wissenschaft, 770 (Frankfurt a. m.: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 29-46.
32 K. Nielsen, ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’, Philosophy, 42 (1967), 191-209 (p. 198).
33 Ibid.
34 P. Winch, ‘understanding a Primitive Society’, in: Religion and Understanding, ed. 
by D. Z. Phillips (oxford: basil blackwell, 1967), pp. 9-42 (p. 12).
35 Ibid., p. 11. Sigrid Fretlöh has analysed the relation of rationality and relativism in 
Winch, Wittgenstein and Quine and especially considered the problem of translation: 
cf. S. Fretlöh, Relativismus versus Universalismus. Zur Kontroverse über Verstehen und 
Übersetzen in der angelsächsischen Sprachphilosophie: Winch, Wittgenstein, Quine: 
Aachener Schriften zur Wissenschaftstheorie, logik und Sprachphilosophie, 3 (Aachen: 
Alano-Verlag, 1989).
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If we follow this conception, then the reality of God can ‘only be seen 
from the religious tradition in which the concept of God is used’.36 The 
use of religious language is the form of life in which the talk of the reality 
of God has to be located – as the magic of the Azande has its place in 
their form of life in which magic practices are done. The respective form 
of life ‘guarantees intelligibility and reality to the concepts in question’.37
There is no clear sense in general questions like ‘what is real?’ or ‘what 
is reality in itself?’. ‘When asked in a  completely general way they are 
meaningless. We can only raise the problem of the reality of something 
within a form of life. There is no completely extra-linguistic or context-
independent conception of reality in accordance with which we might 
judge forms of life.’38 In consequence, the normally assumed relation of 
language and reality has to be modified. It is not the reality which gives 
sense and meaning to language but ‘what is real and what is unreal shows 
itself in the sense that language has’.39 even the distinction between real 
and unreal is one which we make within our language. every language 
knows this distinction. but how exactly it is distinguished between that 
which is real and that which is not real, this becomes clear in the actual 
use of language. This use of language is ignored if we generally verify 
a form of life with a specific concept of reality.
This applies as well to the religious talk about reality. In its articulations 
in Christian faith a specific understanding of reality is expressed. Christian 
talk about God may be characterised through the understanding that 
the reality of God cannot fully and sufficiently be known and asserted. 
Human knowledge and language cannot fully grasp God’s reality and so 
remains indefinite. Therefore the reality of God always again challenges 
human beings to new knowledge, thoughts and words. The triune God 
that Christians believe in, who is revealed through and in language, then 
has to be conceived in that sense as real, as he is asserted in the language 
of Christian faith, which began in the Holy Scriptures and which is used 
by and in the Christian church. only from the meaning, which is defined 
in these texts and usage, is the reference of Christian God-talk guided.
If Christian believers talk about the reality of God they assert not 
an  isolated being of God  – in the sense of a  deictic ontology. rather 
36 P. Winch, Understanding a Primitive Society, p. 12.
37 K. Nielsen, Wittgensteinian Fideism, p. 199.
38 Ibid.
39 P. Winch, Understanding a Primitive Society, p. 13.
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the presence of the story and the relations of God, which he has with 
himself, with the world and with the human being, are asserted. To refer 
to this reality of God would not be possible without the language which 
expresses this reality. In respect to the reality of God therefore it is not the 
concern to fix in an abstract way the referent of the God-talk in the sense 
of its extension. The concern is rather, that in that case ‘vivid language 
wins through’ (‘sich lebendige Sprache bei uns durchsetzt’)40 – as ernst 
Fuchs formulated it. This language introduces a listening human being 
into the matter, which is put forward in this language. In the case of the 
triune God something real, a reality, refers via language to the presence 
and asserts itself: that is, God’s story and history with himself, the world 
and the human being.
How this reality has to be characterised, if and how this reality is 
relevant for human beings, and what its relation is to everything else, 
which reality is asserted in our manifold discourses, this can only be 
answered and clarified in a  presentation and depiction in language, 
which is specific for this reality, the reality of God. In that respect, the 
trinitarian understanding of God is central in Christian faith. Starting 
with the trinitarian name of God it has to be developed, what in 
Christian faith is understood as real in respect of God and his relation to 
the world and the human being. This concerns the reality of the creative 
power of the free God; this concerns the reality of the reconciling love, 
in which God binds himself to the human being and his world; and this 
concerns the reality of the moving power of God’s spirit, who saves the 
human being and his world. It is the claim of Christian faith to refer to 
this reality of the triune God, to define Christian identity in reference to 
it and to orient human beings with that reference in the world.
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40 e. Fuchs, Marburger Hermeneutik: Hermeneutische untersuchungen zur Theologie 9 
(Tübingen: mohr, 1968), p. 239.
